Parallel to the above research we investigated the impact of contested national identity on both Turkish and Japanese foreign policies, and why. Continue...
Japan's Failure to Escape from Asia: Cold War Japan
Japanese foreign policy during the Cold War was largely a response to the memory of its pre-World War II history. The U.S. Occupation of Japan and the Return of Liberal Conservatives and the Yoshida/Kishi School divergent policies toward Asia: Making the New Japan:
Over the course of the past century; two consensuses about national security, the first militarist and the second pacifist, were established. Each was built by shaving the sharp edges of ideological division to accommodate a coherent national strategy. In the process, the mainstream shifted course; once-marginal views were embraced, and broadly shared values splintered. Japanese grand strategy was buffeted by shifts in the domestic civil-military relationship from political leadership to military leadership in the 1930s, from military leadership to bureaucratic leadership in the 1950s, and from bureaucratic to political leadership today. The New Japan P.1:
Despite a pacifist constitution imposed on it in the wake of its defeat in World War II, Japan has largely rearmed and has aligned itself with Washington. The only challenge that remains is the occasional need to make rearmament politically acceptable to the Japanese public — such as, for instance, when public disapproval nearly scampered the reauthorization of Japan’s naval refueling mission in the Indian Ocean.
Members of the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force and supply vessel Tokiwa return Nov. 23, 2007, from their mission to refuel U.S. and other ships in the Indian Ocean.
To reduce associated
risks, Japan will be cautious. It will be normal. It will hedge. The security
strategy and institutions abetting this hedge will be neither too hard
nor too soft. The New Japan
P.2:
Japan's Failure to Escape from Asia: Cold War Japan
Asia-Pacific Rim Hegemony: An Assessment P.1.
Asia-Pacific Rim Hegemony: From Japanese to Chinese Containment? An Assessment P.2.
Postscript:
Constitutionally pacifist Japan is locked in a defense debate — not over whether it should expand its military capability and activity, but rather how. A consensus has emerged that Japan needs to take responsibility for its own defense in a post-Cold War world.
In August 2008 then, war broke out in the Caucasus, and Moscow’s decisive victory over Georgia — and the West’s incapacity to respond — answered any doubts about Russia’s seriousness in maintaining control of its periphery. With its powerful navy and firm alliance with Washington however, Tokyo does not need to fear Russia’s resurgence in the way that members of the former Soviet Union must.
In this initial phase of re-engagement, Moscow is using its old partner North Korea. As a participant in the six-party talks, Moscow has an automatic "in." By offering North Korea economic incentives, Russia can capitalize on the rift between Pyongyang and Beijing, drawing North Korea closer to Moscow as Pyongyang looks for ways to reduce its dependency on China. This, in turn, weakens China's grip on North Korea and reduces its leverage with the United States, South Korea and Japan, as all three are relying on Beijing to deliver North Korea. If Moscow can fill that role, then why look to China?
But Russia's engagement of North Korea is just one piece of its overall strategy. Russia also is working to strengthen its military forces in the Pacific. Traditionally, Moscow uses its military to influence developments in neighboring states. But its military history in the Far East is made up mainly of failures -- such as the Russo-Japanese War -- with few successes. The country has not forgotten this.
Russia has always kept its military strength focused in the Western part of the country in order to protect Moscow, and has largely ignored its Pacific forces. However, during a visit to the disputed Kurile Islands in early April, Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov announced Russian plans to focus its efforts on the Pacific naval fleet. Of Russia's four fleets, three -- the Black Sea, Northern and Baltic fleets -- are designed to cope with threats from the West, but its Pacific fleet lacks the capability to keep up. Addressing the reason for the move, Ivanov said, "[The East] is a region where there is a risk of conflict. Here you have the United States, China, Korea and Japan, and there are absolutely no rules of the game." Other Russian government officials have hinted before that the country might be setting its sights on the East, but this is the first time anyone has said this outright.
Russia has never really needed to protect its eastern front, which is mostly unpopulated -- and for good reason. There is little risk of a major Chinese land grab, given the inhospitable climate. However, now Russia has a very good reason to turn its eyes eastward. Vast, though largely untapped, resources -- from energy to timber to minerals -- lie there, and Moscow appears to be preparing to exploit these resources. Energy, in particular, can offer Moscow additional leverage in East Asia; China, Japan and the Koreas are hungrily eyeing Russian natural gas, and Moscow could very well trap them into depending on it for energy as it did to Europe.
But executing the other parts of Russia's strategy for the East will not be easy or quick. Russia's military and energy strategies will eat up an enormous amount of money; time, which Russia has; and technology, which is rusty at best. This is not to say Russia cannot revamp its military or build many of its planned energy projects, but this would take decades and a lot of cash.
Still, Russia's years of ignoring the Far East are coming to an end. Moscow now sees a small window in which to regain influence, and its first target is North Korea -- which currently acts as a pivot around which the large regional powers rotate. If Moscow can gain a stronger foothold in Pyongyang, it can attain increased leverage and undercut the other large powers.
But Japan does need to be wary of Russia’s above new strategy. And Japan will strive to contain Russia and China and prevent them from growing closer, as the mere thought of an alliance between these giant neighbors worries Tokyo more than anything else.
Should relations worsen between Moscow and Tokyo in a new Cold War environment however, the Kremlin could pinch Japan in a number of ways. It could object more aggressively on the missile defense issue, push against Japanese interests in Sakhalin-2 or even interfere with Japan’s energy supply. It certainly could continue to delay progress on negotiations about the Kuril Islands. Russia could also continue seeking ties with China.
Japan is keeping all this in mind as it — like other countries — reassesses its relationship with Russia. Tokyo’s interests are for the most part aligned with those of the United States, but even without Washington’s influence, Tokyo would be working to distance itself from the Russians.
