A large formation of Russian armor reportedly has emerged on the south side of the two-lane Roki Tunnel, securing a vital logistical link to the breakaway Georgian territory of South Ossetia. Had Georgian troops been able to reach the tunnel, Moscow would have sent its armor down the center of the tunnel at great risk. The tunnel was a key chokepoint that could have been quickly destroyed or blocked. Now Russian troops are likely guarding it very closely as their logistical lifeline.
That a conflict was in the making became first clear to us on March 19, 2008, when Russia’s Duma asked to send more “peacekeepers” (meaning Russian troops) to Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Given the speed with which the Russians reacted to Georgia’s incursion into South Ossetia, Moscow was clearly ready to intervene. We suspect the Georgians were set up for this in some way, but at this point the buildup to the conflict no longer matters. What matters is the message that Russia is sending to the West.
To understand Russian thinking, we need to look at two events. The first is the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. From the U.S. and European point of view, the Orange Revolution represented a triumph of democracy and Western influence. From the Russian point of view, as Moscow made clear, the Orange Revolution was a CIA-funded intrusion into the internal affairs of Ukraine, designed to draw Ukraine into NATO and add to the encirclement of Russia. U.S. Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton had promised the Russians that NATO would not expand into the former Soviet Union empire.
That promise had already been broken in 1998 by NATO’s expansion to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic — and again in the 2004 expansion, which absorbed not only the rest of the former Soviet satellites in what is now Central Europe, but also the three Baltic states, which had been components of the Soviet Union.
The second and lesser event was the decision by Europe and the United States to back Kosovo’s separation from Serbia. Thus if Kosovo could be declared independent under Western sponsorship, then South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the two breakaway regions of Georgia, could be declared independent under Russian sponsorship.
By invading Georgia as Russia did, Putin/Medvedev re-established the credibility of the Russian army. But far more importantly, by doing this they revealed an open secret: While the United States is tied down in the Middle East, American guarantees have no value. This lesson is not for Western consumption. It is something that, from the Russian point of view, the Ukrainians, the Balts and the Central Asians need to digest. Indeed, it is a lesson Putin/Medvedev want to transmit to Poland and the Czech Republic as well. The United States wants to place ballistic missile defense installations in those countries, and the Russians want them to understand that allowing this to happen increases their risk, not their security.
The Russians knew the United States would denounce their attack. This actually plays into Russian hands. The more vocal senior leaders are, the greater the contrast with their inaction, and the Russians wanted to drive home the idea that American guarantees are empty talk.
The Russians also know something else that is of vital importance: For the United States, the Middle East is far more important than the Caucasus, and Iran is particularly important. The United States wants the Russians to participate in sanctions against Iran. Even more importantly, they do not want the Russians to sell weapons to Iran, particularly the highly effective S-300 air defense system. Georgia is a marginal issue to the United States; Iran is a central issue. The Russians are in a position to pose serious problems for the United States not only in Iran, but also with weapons sales to other countries, like Syria.
In other words, the Russians have backed the Americans into a corner. The Europeans, who for the most part lack expeditionary militaries and are dependent upon Russian energy exports, have even fewer options. If nothing else happens, the Russians will have demonstrated that they have resumed their role as a regional power. Russia is not a global power by any means, but a significant regional power with lots of nuclear weapons and an economy that isn’t all too shabby at the moment. It has also compelled every state on the Russian periphery to re-evaluate its position relative to Moscow. As for Georgia, the Russians appear ready to demand the resignation of President Mikhail Saakashvili. Militarily, that is their option. That is all they wanted to demonstrate, and they have demonstrated it.
The war in Georgia, therefore, is Russia’s public return to great power status. This is not something that just happened — it has been unfolding ever since Putin took power, and with growing intensity in the past five years. Part of it has to do with the increase of Russian power, but a great deal of it has to do with the fact that the Middle Eastern wars have left the United States off-balance and short on resources. As we have written, this conflict created a window of opportunity. The Russian goal is to use that window to assert a new reality throughout the region while the Americans are tied down elsewhere and dependent on the Russians. The war was far from a surprise; it has been building for months. But the geopolitical foundations of the war have been building since 1992. Russia has been an empire for centuries. The last 15 years or so were not the new reality, but simply an aberration that would be rectified. And now it is being rectified.
Almost defeated in South Ossetia, Georgia with an army of less than 18,000, cannot hope to withstand the mighty Russian army in Abkhazia. Therefore, President Mikhail Saakashvili, who was planning to join NATO, must consider both breakaway regions lost to Georgia and gained by Russia.
Russian
Air Strikes:
However, appart from the Kosovo factor and Nato enlargement plans, in addition there now, is also a race for control over the pipelines carrying oil and gas out of the Caspian region.
As is known, what may be the world’s largest undeveloped oil and natural gas lay beneath the soil of Central Asia. Between 1996 and 2005, also, a series of four U.S. envoys travelled throughout the region in an effort aimed at developing the East West pipeline from Baku to Thiblizi in Georgia. And even though U.S. companies have only 13 percent equity share in the pipeline; "the United States is strongly identified with the project." (Kopp & Gillespie, Career Diplomacy: Life and Work in the U.S. Foreign Service, 2008, p. 68.)
Sequence of events that led to the current conflict, plus the situation as it is by midnight today:
September-October 2006
Georgia expels six Russian intelligence agents accused of espionage. Russia responds with a full economic embargo of Georgia, including the severance of all transportation and communication links, including rail, road, sea, air, postal, and banking ties. Russian law enforcement raids Georgian businesses in Russia and begins deporting Georgian citizens.
March 11, 2007
Georgian-controlled villages in the Kodori Gorge are attacked by ground-to ground rocket fire, likely from territory controlled by the Abkhaz de facto authorities. The attack is supported by Russian military helicopters, a fact obliquely confirmed by a subsequent report of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). Western leaders fail to react to the UNOMIG report.
May 2007
After elections held in parallel with elections for the Tskhinvali authorities, Georgia introduces a provisional administration in the parts of South Ossetia it controlled since the cease-fire of 1992, under the leadership of Dmitri Sanakoyev, a former high official in the separatist government.
August 6, 2007
A missile dropped by an aircraft lands undetonated near a Georgian radar in Tsitelubani in close proximity of South Ossetia, recently upgraded to NATO standards. Two teams of European and American experts conclude that the action must have been performed by the Russian Air Force. A Russian team of experts instead argues the incident had been staged by Georgia to create an impression of Russian aggression against the country.
February 17, 2008
Kosovo declares independence. President Putin claims Kosovo’s independence, if recognized by western states, will set a precedent with consequences for Abkhazia and South Ossetia. A few weeks later, in an interview with Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Konstantin Zatulin, Deputy Chairman of the Duma Committee on CIS and Compatriot Affairs, suggests the draft presidential decree may be just the first step toward Russian recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It is important to move now, says Zatulin, while Kosovo is still a fresh issue and well before the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi.
March 5, 2008
Tbilisi withdraws from the Joint Control Commission overseeing negotiations over South Ossetia. It instead proposes a format which, apart from Georgia, South Ossetia and Russia, also envisages active roles for the EU, OSCE and the Sanakoyev administration.
March 6, 2008
Russia announces its withdrawal from the 1996 CIS sanctions treaty, which banned trade, economic, financial, transport and other links with Abkhazia.
March 28, 2008
President Mikheil Saakashvili outlines a new peace initiative for Abkhazia, including the establishment of a free economic zone, representation at all levels of the Georgian government, and far-reaching autonomy for Abkhazia.
April 3, 2008
At the NATO summit in Bucharest, Georgia is denied a Membership Action Plan. Georgia and Ukraine are nevertheless assured they will be offered NATO membership at an unspecified point in the future. German chancellor Angel Merkel stresses that a country with unresolved conflicts can nevertheless not join NATO.
April 16, 2008
A Russian presidential decree signed by outgoing President Vladimir Putin instructs the Russian government, as well as Russian regions, to open political, social, and economic relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
The decree in many ways establishes relations between Moscow and the two territories that approximate relations between Moscow and its federal subjects. This is interpreted in Tbilisi as a move to legalize a Russian annexation of the two regions.
April 18, 2008
Abkhazia claims Georgia is reinforcing its troops along the cease-fire line and in the Kodori Gorge. UNOMIG nevertheless states that no troop increases have taken place.
April 21, 2008
An unarmed Georgian UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) is downed over Abkhazia. Citing footage from the UAV’s camera capturing its own destruction by a MiG-29 aircraft as well as radar recordings showing an aircraft taking off from the Gudauta airbase in Abkhazia and departing into
Russian airspace, Georgia accuses the Russian Air Force of downing the UAV. This triggers a diplomatic row, as Tbilisi claims Russia is engaging in military action in Abkhazia, while Russia denies responsibility, claiming the plane was shot down by the Abkhaz air defenses. A UNOMIG investigation subsequently concludes in May that the aircraft was Russian.
April 24, 2008
At the UN, the U.S., UK, France and Germany, all members of the Group of Friends of the Secretary General for Georgia, express concern over Russia’s policy toward Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and President Saakashvili calls for talks on internationalizing the peacekeeping missions in the two regions.
April 29, 2008
The Russian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs claims Georgia has reinforced its military
presence in the Kodori Gorge, preparing for an invasion of Abkhazia. Russia
confirms it is reinforcing its peacekeeping contingent in Abkhazia, and
setting up several new checkpoints along the Inguri River.
UNOMIG subsequently
denies any troop buildup in the Kodori Gorge or along the cease-fire line.
May 8, 2008
Russia confirms having increased its peacekeeping contingent in Abkhazia from 1997 to 2542 soldiers.
May 14, 2008
Abkhazia’s leader Sergey Bagapsh requests permanent Russian military presence in Abkhazia. Such plans are later denied by the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. Georgian officials say a war between Georgia and Russia has been avoided due to French mediation.
May 16, 2008
The UN General Assembly passes a resolution tabled by Georgia on the right of return of all IDPs to Abkhazia. The U.S. votes for the resolution, Russia against; most western European states abstain.
May 21, 2008
Georgia holds parliamentary elections. Two buses intended for transporting Georgians in the Gali region to polling stations are blown up in Khurcha, just across the border in Georgia, injuring four. Tbilisi claims the Abkhaz side is responsible. Later reports by UN observers suggest the incident was staged by Georgian officials.
May 31, 2008
The Russian Ministry of Defense sends about 400 troops from the Russian Defense Ministry Railway Forces to rehabilitate Abkhazian railways. Tbilisi accuses Russia of improving the infrastructure in Abkhazia in preparation for a military intervention.
June 16, 2008
One person is killed and four injured in a skirmish between Georgian and South Ossetian forces in the outskirts of Tskhinvali. Georgian forces confiscate heavy equipment including anti-tank missiles from Russian peacekeepers on the Georgian side of the Georgian-Abkhaz administrative border – weaponry that, according to the agreement on peacekeeping, required notification of Georgian authorities.
June 21, 2008
In an interview with the Georgian newspaper Rezonansi, respected Russian military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer stated that a political decision to start a war in Georgia had been taken in Moscow as early as April. He predicted that a war would start in Abkhazia no later than the middle of August.
July 1, 2008
Sukhumi closes Abkhazia’s de facto border with Georgia.
July 3-4, 2008
An explosion in the South Ossetian village of Dmenisi kills a South Ossetian police chief. Later the same day, a mine attack on a convoy carrying Dmitri Sanakoyev injures three Georgian policemen near Tskhinvali. The attack is followed by an exchange of fire between Sanakoyev’s security personnel and unknown gunmen. At least two people die in shellings in Tskhinvali and surrounding villages.
July 5, 2008
The information services of the North Caucasian Islamic resistance publish an article on their website, Kavkaz-Center, stating that Russia will wage a war in Georgia in August, but placing it in Abkhazia.
July 8, 2008
The Georgian MOD reports the intrusion of four Russian aircraft over South Ossetia. Russia confirms its aircraft entered Georgian airspace to “cool hotheads”, marking the first instance of a violation of airspace not denied by Russia.
July 15, 2008
Russia launches a large-scale military exercise, “Kavkaz-2008”, in 11 regions in the vicinity of the Georgian border. Approximately 8,000 army servicemen participate in the training, which engages paratroopers, the Pskov Airborne division and the Black Sea Fleet. 700 combat vehicles and 20 aircraft are activated and undergo readiness inspections. The Russian authorities refer to the exercise as a pre-planned counter-terrorism operation, but states also that it aims to prepare the troops for involvement in special peacekeeping operations, due to the latest developments in the region.
July 30, 2008
The Russian Ministry of Defense announces the completion of the repair of the 54-kilometer railway linking the Abkhazian capital of Sukhumi with the region of Ochamchire in the Abkhazian conflict zone.
August 1-2, 2008
Tensions in South Ossetia escalate when a military vehicle carrying six Georgian police officers is hit by two remote-controlled explosive devices while travelling on a bypass road linking Georgian villages in the conflict zone with Georgia’s interior. Violence continues in the evening and overnight on August 2. The South Ossetian side reports that six persons, including a member of the North Ossetian peacekeeping battalion, were killed and 15 injured in shelling and sniper attacks from the Georgian side. Georgian authorities report that seven people, including six civilians and one police officer, were injured in mortar attacks against the Georgian-controlled villages of Ergneti, Nuli, Zemo Nikozi and Kvemo Nikozi. The South Ossetian de facto authorities state that they will mobilize their troops, including volunteers from the North Caucasus and Russia, if tensions in the region escalate further. Russian airborne troops commander Valery Evtukhovich announces to Interfax their readiness to assist the Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia if needed.
August 2, 2008
Russian armed forces complete the “Kavkaz-2008” military exercise. However, rather than returning to their bases, the troops remain in their positions by the Georgian border.
August 3-5, 2008
On August 3, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs accuses Tbilisi of aggravating tensions in the South Ossetian conflict zone and announces that Moscow is undertaking efforts to defuse tensions on the ground. Georgian State Minister for Reintegration Temuri Yakobashvili states that Moscow is attempting to stage an illusion of war, aimed at derailing the peace processes in Georgia’s separatist regions. In Abkhazia, de facto President Bagapsh declares that the Abkhazian side will refuse to take part in talks with the Georgian side and the Group of Friends until tensions in South Ossetia deescalate. The de facto South Ossetian authorities announce that 819 women and children are being evacuated from the conflict zone to North Ossetia. The Russian chief negotiator in South Ossetia, Yuri Popov, announces that bilateral talks between the Georgian and South Ossetian authorities will take place under Russian supervision in Tskhinvali on August 7.
August 6, 2008
South Ossetian de facto leader Eduard Kokoity and chief negotiator Boris Chochiev declare their refusal to take part in the meeting with the Georgian side scheduled for August 7, stating that the South Ossetian side will only agree to talks within the JCC format (refused by Tbilisi since March 2008). Tensions escalate again in the afternoon with exchanges of fire between the Georgian-controlled villages of Avnevi and Nuli and the Tskhinvali area.
August 7, 2008
The South Ossetian de facto authorities report that 18 persons have been injured in overnight shelling attacks against the breakaway capital of Tskhinvali and the South Ossetian-controlled villages of Khetagurovo, Dmenisi, Sarabuki and Ubait. The Head of the South Ossetian Security Council, Russian officer Anatoly Barankevich, announces that armed groupings from North Ossetia are headed towards South Ossetia to assist the separatist army to fight the Georgian troops. Georgian State Minister Temuri Yakobashvili departs for South Ossetia in the morning to participate in scheduled talks with the South Ossetian side, but neither the Russian chief negotiator Yuri Popov, nor the South Ossetian side, shows up. Yakobashvili is received instead by Russian peacekeeping commander Marat Kulakhmetov, who states that Russia has lost control over the actions of the separatist army and advises the Georgian government to declare a unilateral ceasefire to allow Russia to defuse tensions in the conflict zone. Shelling and shooting between the Georgian armed forces and South Ossetian rebels resume in the afternoon, killing and wounding several servicemen from both sides.
In Tbilisi,
the Georgian authorities receive foreign intelligence reports about movement
of Russian troops towards the Roki tunnel, connecting North Ossetia with
the South Ossetian conflict zone. Georgian President Saakashvili consults
Western diplomats and is advised by U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State Matthew Bryza not to fall into a trap and to avoid a confrontation
with Russia. At approximately 7 PM, the Georgian government announces its
decision to cease fire in order to defuse tensions and offers to engage
in talks with the South Ossetian side. A few hours later the Georgian authorities
report that several Georgian-controlled villages, including Avnevi, Prisi
and Kurta, have come under heavy fire from the South Ossetian side. According
to multiple and consistent Georgian sources (including witnesses to the
discussions), at approximately 11 PM Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili
receives information that a convoy of over 100 Russian military vehicles
is passing through the Roki tunnel. The Georgian government informs U.S
envoy Bryza that it has no other choice but to advance towards the tunnel
in an attempt to push the Russian troops back. Shortly before midnight,
the Georgian Ministry of Defense announces its decision to restore the
constitutional order in South Ossetia.
Russian Defense
Ministry sources, meanwhile, claim its forces did not enter Georgia until
the afternoon the next day, but have failed to state the exact time of
entry.
August 8, 2008
From midnight on August 8, Georgian troops begin an attack intended to destroy the road connecting the Roki tunnel with Tskhinvali, and advance towards the breakaway capital. Georgian forces seize several South Ossetiancontrolled villages located on higher ground around the breakaway capital. According to Georgian authorities, at approximately 1 AM the Georgian troops succeed in shelling the road south of the Roki tunnel, thus delaying the advance of the Russian convoy. At 2 AM, Georgian ground troops reach Tskhinvali and begin firing rockets against governmental buildings in the city. The shelling of the city continues overnight. In the early morning, the Georgian side reports that additional Russian troops have passed the Roki tunnel and are advancing towards Tskhinvali. At 8 AM, the Georgian air force bombards the Gupta bridge (connecting the region of Java, south of the Roki tunnel, with Tskhinvali), delaying the advance of Russian units on approach to Tskhinvali.
At 10 AM, the Georgian government announces that 1,500 of its 9,000 troops have entered Tskhinvali and that they now control the main part of the conflict zone. At approximately the same time, a first Russian military aircraft enters Georgian airspace from the South Ossetian side, firing several missiles against a radar station in the Georgian-controlled village of Shavshvebi. Air attacks are also carried out against the villages of Variani and Kareli, located 20 km outside the conflict zone, and against the city of Gori. Over the next two hours – that is, only 12-14 hours following the Russian move into Tskhinvali – Russian air and ground troops launch a heavy counter-attack in the South Ossetian conflict zone, which forces the Georgian military out of Tskhinvali. Fighting continues throughout the afternoon, with Georgian troops attempting to push back into the city, but intense artillery and air attacks from the Russian side push them back. Between 3 and 5 PM, three military bases, Vaziani, Marneuli and Bolnisi, all located within 50 km of Tbilisi, are attacked by Russian jets. The Marneuli base is bombed on three occasions, reportedly causing casualties and the destruction of three Georgian military jets and several military vehicles.
At approximately 7 PM, Georgian forces come under additional intense fire from ground forces of the Russian 58th Army, which entered Tskhinvali through the Dzara bypass road, west of the breakaway capital. At approximately 8.30 PM, the Georgian troops are forced to retreat from Tskhinvali, holding their positions south of the city. Throughout August 8, Georgia is exposed to continuous cyber-attacks, disabling access to numerous Georgian websites.
