In fact the admitted mastermind of the serial blasts in Ahmedabad, on July 26, 2008 bombings was a member of the banned Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI).The SIMI/Indian Mujahideen militants may be encouraged and inspired by al Qaeda (as materials recovered from their training facilities have shown), but they appear to be a uniquely Indian phenomenon. So far, their operations appear to have been planned and conducted by Indian citizens who were trained and directed by other Indian citizens using materials procured inside their own country.Both the Ahmedabad and Jaipur attacks, as well as attacks involving eight IEDs that occurred July 25 in Bangalore, have been claimed by an organization calling itself the Indian Mujahideen. In a series of e-mails sent to the Indian press, the organization stated that the operations were intended to demolish the faith of the “infidels in India.” They also claimed that the attacks were in retaliation for the 2002 communal riots in Gujarat in which more than 1,000 (mostly Muslim) people were killed. The e-mail claiming responsibility for the Ahmedabad attacks was sent to news outlets just minutes prior to the attacks — underscoring the claim’s veracity. Indian authorities believe that the Indian Mujahideen is really a pseudonym used by the banned Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI).
Thus it will be very hard for the Indian government to pin these connected attacks on the Pakistani Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and its extensive network inside India. While all leads in Indian counterterrorism investigations normally point to Islamabad, that does not seem to be the case this time. In fact, even if the ISI were to somehow drop its support for Kashmiri militants — something we do not see happening — this particular organization would not seem to be affected. This group’s operations have been small scale and relatively inexpensive to conduct. Such attacks are sustainable and do not require extensive outside funding. If the ISI is backing this group, it has done a very thorough job of hiding its hand.
Indeed, the Indian press recently reported that, according to the interrogations of Nagori, SIMI was experimenting with peroxide-based improvised explosives at its training camps inside India. The group was apparently concerned that the Indian government would clamp down on its ability to obtain commercial explosives and ammonium nitrate fertilizer. This is a clear indication that the militants are not anticipating future shipments of high-explosives from a sponsor such as the Pakistani ISI. Peroxide-based explosives are notoriously fickle, unstable and downright dangerous. Palestinian bombmakers gave peroxide-based explosives such as triacetone triperoxide (TATP) the nickname “mother of Satan” for good reason. Militants would certainly not bother with such unreliable and dangerous improvised mixtures if they had any hope of receiving military-grade explosives from a state sponsor.
Some Indian media outlets have claimed that the presence of electronic components from Southeast Asia in the timers used in the Surat devices indicates that there is a connection to Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the Indonesian-based al Qaeda franchise. However, electronic components such as integrated circuits manufactured in Southeast Asia can be found in nearly every part of the world, including India. It is, therefore, very tenuous to try to draw a link to JI based on that fact. Plans for integrated circuit timers are widely available in jihadist literature and are not difficult to assemble — though, as previously noted, the timers fabricated for the attacks in Surat appear to have somehow been botched.
The strategic objective of these attacks has been twofold. The first objective was to incite communal riots between Hindus and Muslims and to inflame political tensions between Islamabad and New Delhi. Meeting this objective would allow these groups to highlight any grievances Indian Muslims have with the Indian government and expand their support base within the country by radicalizing Muslims — and Muslim youth specifically. The second objective was to damage the Indian economy. Bangalore, Ahmedabad and Surat are important commercial centers, and Jaipur is a popular tourist city.
To date, these attacks have not been successful in achieving these objectives, though the ease with which the network was able to recruit and train young militants may be a sign that the militants are making progress in their efforts to radicalize Muslim youth. However, with elections coming up and Hindu nationalist political parties stepping up their activity, the network has a prime window of opportunity in which to incite communal violence. Recently, protests by members of Hindu national party Shiv Sena in Gujarat and Maharashtra have included marches through Muslim neighborhoods, with protestors demanding that all madrassas be closed — partly in response to the recent attacks.
While there have been a number of significant arrests, it will be difficult for the Indian government to stamp out this domestic, self-replicating network. As an indigenous organization, however, the operational abilities of the network will be limited. Without outside assistance it will likely continue to conduct simple attacks against soft targets. This militant network has not yet begun to conduct large al Qaeda-type attacks or to use suicide operatives, but this could change should the network fall further under the sway of the international al Qaeda movement.